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Abstract: In this reply we show that the Nüesch (2009) comment paper to our initial 
contribution (Torgler and Schmidt 2007) has several shortcomings. He suggests that 
professional soccer wages seem to buy talent rather than motivation. We therefore 
provide a larger set of talent proxies and estimations to check whether this assertion is 
correct. Our results indicate that his conclusion is problematic. We still observe a strong 
motivational effect, and in some cases the effect is even larger than the talent effect. A 
further key problem in Nüesch’s contribution is the fact that he neglects to consider the 
relevance of the relative salary situation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Stephan Nüesch (2009) has recently written a comment paper to our contribution Torgler 
and Schmidt (2007) published in Applied Economics. His main criticism is that in 
professional soccer wages seem to buy talent rather than motivation. He acknowledges that 
we controlled for time-constant talent but not time-varying talent. He uses appearances as a 
time-varying talent proxy and reports the results obtained using the same soccer league 
(Bundesliga) but adding more seasons (period between 1995/96 and 2006/07).  He suggests 
that the wage effect disappears after controlling for appearances. In this reply we criticize 
several aspects of his contribution. 
 
 
                                                 

 Both authors are also associated with CREMA – Center for Research in Economics, Management 
and the Arts, Switzerland. Benno Torgler is also associated with CESifo in Munich, Germany and the 
National Centre for Econometric Research in Australia. We are thankful to Alison Macintyre for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  
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2. Appearances as a Proxy for Talent 
 
Appearance is not a clear proxy for talent as this variable not only covers talent but 
“opportunity”.  If a trainer gives a player the chance to appear more frequently (for 
whatever reason), the player also has a higher opportunity to perform better, regardless of 
talent. Nüesch (2009) somehow assumes that trainers have a limited utility function. 
Taking into account that in many cases players have a very similar talent profile (marginal 
differences can already lead to a superstardom) it is not fully clear why Nüesch’s 
assumption should hold. Other factors beside talent may explain the level of appearances. 
In addition, trainers often behave strategically by, for example, making sure that key 
players are in shape for other even more important tournaments (e.g., Champions League), 
which may lead to less appearances in the national league.  
 
Now, let us assume that we do in fact need to take appearances into account. A natural way 
would then be to correct the dependent variable by the level of appearances (goals per 
game, assists per game). We will present results that show the motivational effect does not 
disappear when using such an approach. Moreover, one can even go a step further by using 
minutes played instead of games played as an independent variable. This would more 
adequately show what trainers think of a player. Controlling for minutes played we also 
observe that the motivational effect does not disappear.  
 
In addition, to better isolate talent, one could think of using lagged values of the variable 
appearances (e.g., number of games played in the previous season). This allows us to better 
isolate the “opportunity” effect. We therefore present evidence using such an approach yet 
we cannot conclude based on our results that wages seem to buy talent rather than 
motivation. Motivation remains a key issue in understanding performance.  
 
3. What about the Relative Salary?  
 
Nüesch (2009) also fails to discuss the importance of the relative salary situation. We 
originally argued and provided empirical support that individual salary position relative to 
that of other team-mates has an impact on performance (Torgler and Schmidt (2007)). The 
study used the difference between team-mates’ average salaries and players’ individual 
salaries as a proxy. Surprisingly, Nüesch (2009) does not discuss the relative salary 
position at all, although we show that this effect is even larger than the absolute salary one. 
This is a surprise insofar as he criticizes the absence of a motivational effect. However, 
without controlling for the relative income position it is questionable whether one may 
assert that there is no motivational effect at all.  
 
4.  Empirical Evidence 
 
We present empirical evidence in Table 1 and 2 indicating that Nüesch’s conclusions are 
problematic. In line with our previous paper Torgler and Schmidt (2007) we present OLS 
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and FE estimations using the same control variables (see also Nüesch 2008). In Eq. (1) and 
(2) we present evidence using goals per game and assists per game as dependent variables. 
The results indicate that the absolute salary has an impact on performance. In Eq. (3) and 
(4) we extend the specification with the relative salary variables and here also observe that 
salary matters. Both absolute and relative salary position affect the goals and assists per 
game in almost all the cases. In a further step, we focus on overall goals and assists instead 
of goals and assists per game using minutes played as an independent variable. The results 
are presented in Eq. (5) and (6). In both cases we find that the relative salary position 
influences the performance. In Eq. (7) and (8) we switch to fixed effects estimations 
controlling not only for time and team effects (as used previously), but also for individual 
effects. In Eq. (9) and (10) we add the relative salary position. As can be seen the relative 
salary position is statistically significant in both equations and the absolute salary is also 
statistically significant in Eq. (7). Thus, using FE leads to a similar picture. We cannot 
conclude that motivational effects are not visible. In Eq. (11) and (12) we control for the 
minutes played. Eq. (12) also supports the results obtained previously, indicating that the 
relative salary is relevant. 
 
Table 1: Motivational Effect Versus Talent Effect 
 
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent Variable:  Goals per 
game 
Assists per 
game 
Goals per 
game 
Assists 
per game 
Goals Assists 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Salary/Motivation 
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) 0.550*** 0.455*** 0.227*** 0.347*** -0.017 0.010 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.202*** -0.155*** -0.206*** -0.156*** 0.001 0.023 
RELATIVE SALARY   -0.278*** -0.092 -0.161*** -0.112* 
Talent 
Minutes Played     0.446*** 0.505*** 
Further factors 
Socio-demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Changed team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Position Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Players No No No No No No 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.341 0.203 0.345 0.203 0.500 0.452 
Notes: Number of observations is 2833. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. OLS estimations: beta coefficients.  
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Table 1 continued 
 
Model: FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Dependent Variable:  Goals per 
game 
Assists 
per game 
Goals per 
game 
Assists 
per game 
Goals Assists 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Salary/Motivation 
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) 0.006** 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.120 -0.250*** 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.0004** 0.0000 -0.0004** -0.0001 -0.003 0.002 
RELATIVE SALARY   -0.009** -0.007* -0.103 -0.183** 
Talent 
Minutes Played     0.002*** 0.002*** 
Further factors 
Socio-demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Changed team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Position Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Players Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.076 0.049 0.078 0.050 0.316 0.319 
 
In Table 2 we present further robustness tests. Instead of using minutes played to estimate 
Eq. (13) to (16), we use in line with Nüesch (2009) games played (number of appearances). 
The results also support our previous findings and tend to indicate that the relative salary is 
relevant. Eq. (13) even indicates that the relative salary effect is stronger than the talent 
(appearances) effect. In the final four estimations (Eq. (17) to (20)) we isolate the 
opportunity factor by focusing on lagged appearances (games played in the previous 
season). The previous results are also confirmed here. Motivation cannot be neglected. Eq. 
(17) and (18) also report a stronger relative impact of the relative salary position in relation 
to our talent proxy. 
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Table 2: Further Robustness Tests 
 
Model: OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE 
Dependent Variable:  Goals Assists Goals Assists Goals Assists Goals Assists 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Salary/Motivation         
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) 0.007 0.023 -0.131 -0.261*** 0.222 0.268* 0.036 0.079 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.002 0.009 -0.004 0.001 -0.246*** -0.229*** -0.008 -0.012** 
RELATIVE SALARY -0.323*** -0.153** -0.159 -0.229*** -0.310*** -0.298*** -0.090 -0.276* 
Talent         
Games Played 0.139*** 0.474*** 0.136*** 0.132***     
Games Played Previous Season     0.060** 0.075*** -0.001 -0.020 
Further factors         
Socio-demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Changed team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Position Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Players No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.477 0.440 0.272 0.288 0.394 0.292 0.118 0.138 
 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. OLS estimations: beta coefficients.
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5. Conclusions 
 
In sum, we have shown that the comments by Nüesch (2009) are problematic. One cannot 
argue that wages seem to buy talent rather than motivation. Compared to the analysis 
conducted by Nüesch (2009) we present a larger set of specifications and proxies for 
appearances. Our findings are not in line with his results. Nüesch (2009) also fails to take 
into account that there is not only an absolute effect but also a relative one that cannot be 
neglected. It is also interesting to note that the motivational effect is also visible in other 
sports disciplines. Schaffner and Torgler (2008) explore the NBA focusing on 1733 players 
for the seasons 1979/80 till 2006/07 using three overall productivity measures and taking 
appearances into account. The results show that the absolute salary matters. The study also 
observes behavioral consequences of a relative salary position that is driven by job profile 
closeness and personal and daily interactions. Thus, this study also shows that the salary 
situation helps to understand the performance by acknowledging the importance of a 
motivational effect.  
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